NON-PUBLIC?: N
ACCESSION #: 8808180234
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Nine Mile Point Unit 2 PAGE: 1 of 3

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000410

TITLE: Reactor Scram due to Electrohydraulic Control Fluid Leak
EVENT DATE: 07/11/88 LER #: 88-028-00 REPORT DATE: 08/09/88

OPERATING MODE: 1 POWER LEVEL: 045

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION
50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:
NAME: Robert E. Jenkins, Assistant Supervisor Technical Support
TELEPHONE #: 315-349-4220

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: No

ABSTRACT: On July 11, 1988 at 0305 hours Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature, specifically a manual reactor scram. At the time of the event the reactor mode switch was in the "RUN" position with the reactor at approximately 45% of rated thermal power.

At approximately 0037 hours on July 11, 1988 an Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) fluid leak was discovered on a turbine control valve. Attempts to isolate the leak were unsuccessful. Upon reaching the low level point in the EHC reservoir, the decision was made to manually scram the reactor. The scram was initiated at 0305 hours.

The immediate cause of the event was a loose fitting causing an EHC fluid leak. The most probable root cause is installation deficiency by contractor personnel.

Immediate action was to enter into operating procedure N2-OP-101C, "Scram Recovery". Corrective actions include the issuance of a work request to repair the EHC fitting leak and issuance of a Problem Report to initiate corrective actions, as required, to prevent similar occurrences.

(End of Abstract)

I. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT

On July 11, 1988 at 0305 hours Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) experienced an actuation of an Engineered Safety Feature, specifically a manual reactor scram. At the time of the event the reactor mode switch was in the "RUN" position with the reactor at approximately 45% of rated thermal power.

At approximately 0037 hours on July 11, 1988 an Electrohydraulic Control (EHC) fluid leak was discovered on a turbine control valve during normal operator rounds. The leak was identified to be on the sensing line for the reactor protection system pressure switch which monitors EHC fluid pressure at the fast acting solenoid. Subsequent attempts to tighten the fitting at which the leak was occurring were unsuccessful.

Reactor power was reduced in order to remove the turbine from operation and continue with a normal shutdown. However, the leak continued to increase, and the Station Shift Supervisor (SSS) determined that the reactor should be manually scrammed when the EHC reservoir reached the low level alarm point. The manual scram was initiated at 0305 hours.

There were no other components or systems which were inoperable and/or out of service which contributed to the event. No plant system or component failures resulted from the event.

II. CAUSE OF EVENT

The immediate cause of this event was a loose fitting which resulted in an EHC fluid leak. The leak was identified to be on the sensing line which monitors EHC fluid pressure at the fast acting solenoid.

The cause of the loosened fitting could not be determined. Other fittings (48 fittings) used in similar applications were checked for tightness and for signs of leaking. Each was found to be secure and leak free. In addition, after the fluid pressure was removed, the leaking fitting was tightened and has since performed adequately.

The most probable root cause is installation deficiency by contractor personnel.

III. ANALYSIS OF EVENT

A manual reactor scram is a conservative event and poses no adverse safety

consequences at any reactor power. This event did not adversely affect any safety system nor the operators' ability to achieve safe shutdown.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTION

Initial action was to enter into operating procedure N2-OP-101C, "Scram Recovery".

A work request (WR 134874) was issued to perform repair work on the turbine valve fitting. Per WR 134874, the loose fitting at control valve #3 was tightened. Other fittings used in similar applications were checked for tightness and found to be secure. A Problem Report (PR 8011) was issued to initiate corrective actions to prevent similar occurrences. Via PR 8011, a modification request (modification control number N2Y88MX127) has been issued to evaluate the need for an EHC tubing modification. If warranted by the outcome of this evaluation, modifications will be made.

V. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A. Identification of Components Referred to in this LER

IEEE 803 IEEE 805
Component EIIS Funct System ID

Fitting PSF TF
Turbine Control (EHC) N/A TG
Turbine Control Valve FCV TA
Turbine TRB TA

B. Component Failures - None

C. There have been no previous similar events.

ATTACHMENT # 1 TO ANO # 8808180234 PAGE: 1 of 1

NIAGARA NMP 37819
MOHAWK
NINE MILE POINT -- UNIT 2/P.O. BOX 63, LYCOMING, NY 13093/TELEPHONE (315) 343-2110

August 9, 1988

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-410
LER 88-28

Gentlemen:

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following Licensee Event Report:

LER 88-28 Is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF), including the Reactor Protection System (RPS)."

A 10CFR50.72 (b)(2)(ii) report was made at approximately 0346 hours on July 11, 1988.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022, Supplement 2, dated September 1985.

Very truly yours,

/s/ J. L. WILLIS
J. L. Willis
General Superintendent
Nuclear Generation

JLW/JMT/mjd

Attachments

cc: Regional Administrator, Region 1
Sr. Resident Inspector, W. A. Cook

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